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11. Introduction
Environmental goods and services are now being largely provided by a sizeable and
fast-growing specialized industry. Over the last 40 years, this so-called "eco-industry"
has come to rival the aerospace and pharmaceutical sectors in size, accounting for about
1.7% of employment and 2.2% of gross domestic product in the European Union and the
United States at the present time, and totalling expected global revenue of US$ 776 billion
in 2010 and US$ 800 billion in 2015.1 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development and the Statistical Oﬃce of the European Commission [OECD/Eurostat
(1999)] deﬁne the eco-industry as the set of “(...) activities which produce goods and
services to measure, prevent, limit, minimize or correct environmental damage to water,
air, and soil, as well as problems related to waste, noise and eco-systems. These include
cleaner technologies, products and services which reduce environmental risk and minimize
pollution and resource use.” Pollution abatement goods, services and technologies make up
more than 80% of the industry’s income [Institut Français de l’Environnement (2002)].
According to the OECD (2002), current growth is driven by demand from the private
sector: the Institute of Clean Air Companies (ICAC), for example, an American nonproﬁt
association of enterprises supplying stationary-source air pollution control technology and
monitoring systems, recently projected that its United States market will hover around
US$ 7 billion a year through 2010, the largest segments remaining those for SO2 and NO
technologies which essentially address the needs of privately-held industrial units.
1For additional ﬁgures and trends concerning the eco-industry, together with a short history of the
sector and a discussion of its deﬁnition, see Sinclair-Desgagné (2008).
2In sum, polluters rely more and more on external suppliers for the goods, services and
technologies necessary to comply with environmental laws and regulations; this especially
happens in dealing with air pollutants, wastewater and solid-waste. Experts and prac-
titioners allege that polluting ﬁrms can thereby focus on their respective core business,
access leading expertise, and share risk [see, e.g., Miladin (2005), Blocki (2002), Shelley
(1997)]. This paper’s objective is to formally examine such rationales and dig out the
circumstances in which they hold.
Our analysis draws from the early literature on vertical integration. We ﬁnd, for
instance, that polluting ﬁrms will do less in-house abatement and increase outside pro-
curement of environmental goods and services as their product market expands. This cor-
roborates Stigler (1951)’s (and Adam Smith’s) well-known prediction that “the division
of labor is limited by the extent of the market.” It also supports the above “core-business”
explanation. The result is guaranteed to hold, however, only when the production and
abatement technologies meet speciﬁc conditions which are spelled out below.
Our modelling approach builds additionally on the emerging theoretical environmental
economics literature which studies the eco-industry [see, e.g., David and Sinclair-Desgagné
(2009, 2005), Requate (2005), Greaker and Rosendhal (2008), David et al (2008), Canton
et al. (2007), Nimubona and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005), Perino (2009)].2 This work has
so far centered primarily on the policy consequences of imperfect competition between
abatement suppliers. It acknowledges the existence of the eco-industry and is essentially
2 A survey of this literature can be found in Sinclair-Desgagné (2008).
3normative in scope. By contrast, this paper chieﬂy constitutes an essay in positive eco-
nomics that seeks to explain the extent of the eco-industry.
The following section will now present a simple (partial equilibrium) model of the
market for abatement. On this basis, Section 3 uses comparative statics to analyze a
polluting ﬁrm’s decision to increment its external procurement of abatement goods and
services. Section 4 outlines some policy implications. Section 5 ﬁnally highlights this
paper’s main ﬁndings, pointing out speciﬁc traits of abatement outsourcing that do not
ﬁt the current theory of vertical integration and would call for further investigation. All
mathematical assumptions and derivations are summarized in an appendix.
2. The model
Imagine a representative ﬁrm subject to a tax on its polluting emissions. To alleviate
the ﬁscal burden, this ﬁrm might expend in-house eﬀorts in controlling emissions and/or
procure abatement goods and services from an external supplier (the abater). Thereafter,
we assume the latter is a monopoly, while the polluting ﬁrm is a price-taker on both the
output and pollution abatement markets. This setting is that of a young abatement goods
and services industry; paraphrasing Stigler (1951, p. 188):
With the expansion of the [polluting] industry, the magnitude of the [emission
control] function subject to increasing returns may become suﬃcient to permit
a ﬁrm to specialize in performing it. The [polluting] ﬁrms will then abandon
[at least part of] the [pollution abatement] process and a new ﬁrm will take
it over. This new ﬁrm [here, the abater] will be a monopoly (...). With the
continued expansion of the [polluting] industry, the number of [abatement
supplying] ﬁrms will increase, so that the new [abatement] industry becomes
competitive (...). [Italics and terms between brackets added]
It also seems to ﬁt several stylized facts about the abatement goods and services market.
4The Texas Center for Policy Studies reports, for example, that:
"Area sources" are small, stationary sources that usually do not emit large
amounts of criteria pollutants or toxics. (...) Important area sources include
dry cleaners, printers, machine shops, service stations, wastewater treatment
plants, auto painting, repair shops and consumers who use household consumer
items. While these "small" businesses and consumer activities individually do
not contribute large amounts of pollution to the atmosphere, taken collectively
they emit more of some types of pollutants than do some individual large
industries. In many cities in Texas, area sources contribute more VOCs to
smog formation than do major stationary sources.
Meanwhile, the Institute of Clean Air Companies often displays only one supplier of
certain technologies to abate volatile organic compounds (VOCs).
Let us now describe formally the polluter’s and the abater’s respective behavior.
◦ The polluting ﬁrm
Let the representative polluter set its production level , internal abatement eﬀort 
and quantity of procured abatement goods and services (AGS)  from the interval [0∞)
in order to maximize the proﬁtf u n c t i o n
()= ·  − (;) −  · (;) −  ·  .( 1 )
The letters , ,a n d refer respectively to the price of output, the emission tax level
and the price of outsourced AGS. The function (;) gives the cost of production;
it is indexed by an exogenous parameter  a n di sa s s u m e dt ob et w i c ec o n t i n u o u s l y
diﬀerentiable, increasing and convex in  and  (so the ﬁrst and second-order derivatives
,  and ,  are positive). The expression (;), ﬁnally, also indexed by an
exogenous technical parameter ,d e n o t e st h eﬁrm’s emission function; all other things
remaining constant, it increases, and increases faster, with the quantity produced  (so the
ﬁrst and second-order derivatives  and  are positive) but goes down, at a decreasing
5rate, as the abatement expenses  and  get larger (so ,   0 and ,   0).
To be optimal, ,  and  must then satisfy the necessary and suﬃcient ﬁrst-order
conditions given by
 =  −  −  ·  5 0( = 0    0) (2)
 = − −  ·  5 0( = 0    0) (3)
 = − ·  −  5 0( = 0    0) (4)
Expression (2) says that the emission tax  should not be so high if any production is to
take place. Expressions (3) and (4), on the other hand, mean that some positive penalty
(0) is necessary to induce abatement eﬀorts (   0). If  5 , moreover (so
the abater’s technology does not curb emissions better than the polluter’s own abatement
expenses), AGS outsourcing does not occur (i.e.  =0 ) when the price  is greater that
the marginal cost  of in-house abatement (for in this case:   = −· = −·).3
Assuming thereafter that    (so an additional unit of outsourced AGS reduces
emissions more than an additional unit of in-house abatement eﬀort), condition (4) now
yields the inverse demand for AGS:
 = − · (;).( 5 )
Demand is enhanced, naturally, by a larger emission tax . As stressed by Canton et al
(2007), it also depends on the relative eﬀectiveness of abatement technologies, which is
captured here by the second-order derivatives    and . The curvature ,
in particular, plays a key role that we shall now spell out.
3 When   , however, it may happen that 0 while  . This qualiﬁes Stigler (1951, p.
188)’s assertion that the new AGS supplier "(...) cannot charge a price for the process higher than the
average cost of the process to the ﬁrms which are abandoning it."
6◦ The pollution-abatement supplier
The AGS provider’s proﬁt, on the other hand, can be written as
()= ·  − (;) ,( 6 )
where (;), indexed by the exogenous parameter  and assumed increasing and convex
in  (so  and  are positive), stands for the cost of bringing an amount  of AGS to
the market. Substituting the polluting ﬁrm’s demand (5) in the latter expression yields
()=− · (;) ·  − (;) .( 7 )
Suppose that the function (;) is "moderately" convex in , so the product ·
is decreasing in . Necessary and suﬃcient conditions for a proﬁt-maximizing delivery of
AGS are then
 = − ·  ·  −  ·  −  5 0( = 0    0) .( 8 )
This entails that the unit price for a positive quantity of AGS will be
 =  +  ·  ·  ;( 9 )
it is equal to the marginal cost at  plus a positive term proportional to the tax level ,
the quantity  and the curvature . Using (9), one gets the familiar expression for the
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where  = 
 · 1
 is indeed the price-elasticity of demand for AGS. A lower elasticity,
induced for instance by a higher tax , allows therefore the abater to charge a higher
markup (all other things remaining the same).
7David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005) pointed out that the price-elasticity  goes
down with , so a bigger emission tax grants the AGS supplier more market power.4 This
assertion remains on the whole valid here, but the possibility polluters have to abate their
emissions in-house calls for some qualiﬁcations.5
3. Results
Let us now investigate how in-house abatement eﬀorts  and the amount of outsourced
AGS  respectively vary when circumstances are diﬀerent. We assume that no situation
causes a ﬁrm to exit; in other words, 0 and 0 throughout the current exercise. We
also suppose that polluters always perform some (even tiny) emission control themselves,
so 0. Conditions (2), (3), (4) then hold as equalities. Total diﬀerentiation of these
conditions, taking into account that the price  of AGS is set via formula (9), gives
⎡
⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢ ⎢
⎣
−( +  · ) −( +  · ) − · 
−( +  · ) −( +  · ) − · 
−( + ) −( ·  + ) −( ·  + )
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
⎛
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−10   · 
00    · 
0  0  +   ·  + 
⎤
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⎦
⎛
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(11)
4 David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005, p. 141) actually made a more general statement: "(...) each
regulatory instrument (emission taxes and quotas; design standards; and voluntary agreements) has a
speciﬁc impact on the price-elasticity of the polluters’ demand for abatement services, hence on the
market power of the eco-industry and the resulting cost of abatement."
5 Qualiﬁcations are also necessary if other suppliers can enter the market for AGS. This case was
recently examined by David et al (2008).
8Following standard comparative statics practice, the respective impact on , ,a n d
 of a change in the output market price , the abater’s and the polluter’s respective
cost parameters  and  (to be given precise meaning below), the emission tax  and the






now be assessed using Cramer’s rule. Note beforehand that concavity of the polluting
ﬁrm’s objective requires that the determinant of the 3x3 matrix on the left-hand side,
noted 3, be negative, and the determinant
2 =
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
−( +  · ) −( +  · )
−( +  · ) −( +  · )
¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
=(  +  · )( +  · ) − ( +  · )
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be positive. This completes the mathematical preliminaries to investigate some commonly
stated rationales for outsourcing AGS.
3.1 More outsourcing of abatement makes compliance cheaper
An obvious reason to switch from in-house to externally provided AGS is that the
latter are less expensive. Suppose indeed that an increase in the technical parameter 
indicates that the marginal cost of making AGS is lower; i.e.   0. Formula (9) implies,
then, that   0; in other words, the market price of AGS goes down. By Cramer’s rule




= − [ · 2]  0 ,( 1 2 )
so the quantity of procured AGS increases, as expected.




= − [−(( +  · ) − ( +  · ))] .( 1 3 )
One might reasonably assume that  and  are negative, so taking more abatement
measures (in-house or outsourced) reduces the environmental impact of production, and
that   0, so raising in-house abatement eﬀorts increases the marginal cost of produc-
tion (because managerial time and attention, say, are scarce resources). The sign of 

then depends on that of the sum  +  ·  and the cross-derivative .
A positive  would mean that internal and outsourced AGS are substitutes:m o r e
of the latter renders the former less eﬀective (recall that ,   0). In this case, if
the marginal beneﬁt of in-house abatement in terms of tax reduction − ·  does not
compensate for its cost  (i.e.  +  ·   0), then 
  0, so in-house abatement
certainly decreases when procured AGS are cheaper. A negative , on the other hand,
portends complementary instruments: more of one enhances the other’s performance at
reducing emissions (as in several cases actually reported by the ICAC). If, additionally,
the opportunity cost of internal resources is relatively small compared to ﬁscal beneﬁts
(i.e.  +  ·   0), then 
  0. In other circumstances, the sign of 
 is ambiguous.
The following proposition summarizes these ﬁndings.
Proposition 1: Suppose the marginal cost of external abatement goes down (i.e.  
0). This entails that the market price of AGS decreases, so more abatement eﬀort will
be outsourced. On the other hand (provided ,   0 and   0) ,t h e r ew i l lb el e s s
(more) internal abatement if internal and outsourced AGS are substitutes (complements)
and in-house abatement brings more (less) costs than beneﬁts at the margin.
10T h es e c o n ds e n t e n c es u g g e s t st h a tt o t a la b a t e m e n te ﬀort (external plus in-house)
might actually decrease if the eco-industry becomes more eﬃcient at making abatement
goods and services. Indeed, with  =  +  denoting total abatement eﬀort, we have
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which is negative if and only if +·(−)  0, i.e. if  is large enough (so internal
and external abatement are strong substitutes). This seems to run counter to traditional
wisdom, which rather expects that a lower marginal cost of abatement (all other things, in
particular the emission tax, remaining the same) means greater eﬀort will be expended at
reducing pollution. What we did here, however, was to enter the “black box” of pollution
abatement, considering it normally has two components - internal and outsourced - with
diﬀerent marginal costs; an uncompensated change in only one of the latter may then
lead polluters to reallocate their abatement eﬀo r ti nw a y st h a tc a ns u r p r i s ea no u t s i d e r
who sees only the aggregate.
3.2 More outsourcing of abatement allows to curb emissions more eﬀectively
Another natural argument to justify greater outsourcing of AGS is that this provides
access to leading expertise and state-of-the-art technology.6 In the present model, the
6 For (albeit preliminary) evidence, the interested reader may have a look at the various case studies
reported on the ICAC’s website (www.icac.com).
11parameter  can be used to indicate the quality of the technology available on the market:
let  =  =0and ,   0,s oal a r g e r strictly means that procured AGS are
more eﬀective and experience less decreasing returns at controlling emissions. The pricing
formula (9) then implies that  = · ·0, so the market price of AGS goes down





= − [( ·  + )2]  0 .( 1 4 )
Better returns on external abatement therefore augments AGS outsourcing, as predicted.
The eﬀect of a greater  on in-house abatement eﬀorts, in contrast, depends again on




= − [−( ·  + )(( +  · ) − ( +  · ))] .( 1 5 )
In the previously mentioned scenario where   0 (in-house and outsourced abatement
are substitutes) and +·  0 (internal resources devoted to abatement carry a large
opportunity cost), the derivative 
 is (rather intuitively) negative. It wears the opposite
sign if   0 (in-house and outsourced abatement are complements) and +·  0
(internal resources devoted to abatement give rise to a signiﬁcant ﬁscal beneﬁt). Its sign
is ambiguous otherwise.
These developments support a second proposition.
Proposition 2: Suppose the external abatement technology improves (meaning that ,
  0). Polluting ﬁrms will then buy more abatement goods and services. However
(provided ,   0,   0), there will be less (more) internal abatement expenses
12if these are substitutes (complements) to outsourced AGS and the opportunity cost of in-
house abatement is at the margin larger (smaller) than its beneﬁts.
This proposition is analogous to the previous one and calls for the same observations.
It underscores again the importance of entering the “black box” of abatement, in order
to better understand and predict the overall eﬀorts made by private ﬁrms to meet their
environmental constraints.
3.3 More outsourcing of abatement brings more focus
Having an outside supplier take care of emission control clearly allows polluting ﬁrms
to concentrate on their core business. This corroborating statement from Blocki (2002) is
typical in the professional literature on the subject: "The primary beneﬁto ﬀered by an
abatement contractor is focus. The plant and its staﬀ are focused on getting the product
out the door and keeping the production equipment operating. An abatement contractor
has no focus on the client’s production; its only focus is the abatement system." The
latter sentence suggests a setting with no technical synergy between in-house and external
abatement; accordingly, let’s assume that  =0 ,s o =0by formula (9).
Suppose now that the polluting ﬁrm ﬁnds it more costly to produce when more man-
agerial time is put on controlling emissions; i.e., in formal terms,   0.A n dl e tal a r g e r
parameter  aﬀect only the marginal cost of internal abatement, meaning that the mar-
ginal cost of in-house abatement has gone up; that is,  =0and   0. By Cramer’s
rule, the derivative 




= − [( +  · )( + )] .( 1 6 )
13Let  be large enough so that +·  0.I f  0 as before, the sign of 
 depends
on the value of  = · ·, which captures the change in returns on outsourced AGS
as output increases. A negative value, showing (rather realistically) that the returns on
t h ea b a t e r ’ se x t r ae ﬀorts are less decreasing at higher production levels, implies indeed
that 
  0.




= − [(( +  · )( ·  + ) − ( + ))] .( 1 7 )
Assuming that   0 (so returns on outsourced AGS are more decreasing as the amount
 grows), which implies that   0,t h i sd e r i v a t i v ei sa s s u r e dt ob en e g a t i v ei f ≈ 0.
Noting that a pure end-of-pipe abatement technology would have  =0 ,at h i r d
proposition is now at hand.
Proposition 3: Suppose the opportunity cost of managerial attention for doing abate-
ment in-house increases (i.e.   0,w h i l e =0 ,   0 and  +  ·   0).
Then (assuming   0,   0), AGS procurement increases and internal abatement
declines, the latter provided the eco-industry oﬀers what are basically end-of-pipe solutions.
This statement gives a rationale for the fact that, by and large, the eco-industry mostly
concentrates on supplying end-of-pipe abatement devices [see Sinclair-Desgagné (2008)].
Over the last decades, increased competitive pressure (owing notably to globalization)
and what was to become conventional wisdom across business [thanks in particular to
Prahalad and Hamel (1990)’s inﬂuential article] have made managerial time even scarcer.
This encouraged the externalization of abatement, especially when it is end-of-pipe and
14holds therefore little synergy with a polluting ﬁrm’s production.
3.4 More outsourcing of abatement stems from “the extent of the market”
Finally, economists have noticed some time ago that bigger markets foster special-
ization. Let us ﬁrst examine this proposition when the output market expands, which
corresponds to the Smith-Stigler’s case. Throughout this subsection, we assume that
 =0(which implies that  =0 ), so no synergy exists between in-house and out-
sourced abatement,   0 and  = ·· ≤ 0. A higher price  now truly indicates




=  [( +  · )( ·  + )]  0 .( 1 8 )








= − [( +  · )( + )] .( 2 0 )
The latter has the predicted positive sign if   0, i.e. if the abater does not solely
oﬀer pure end-of-pipe abatement solutions; otherwise, 
 =0(for  =0when  =0 ).
This constitutes an interesting qualiﬁcation of the Smith-Stigler theorem (one which is,
furthermore, speciﬁc to this environmental context): end-of-pipe pollution abatement
not being a productive input, an extension of the downstream market (everything else
remaining constant) may then not aﬀect its level.
In the same vein, the sign of 
 depends on that of  +·.O n em a yh a v e
  0
15when  is negative (or even when  is smaller than − · ). This will happen if
more in-house abatement eﬀorts actually decrease the marginal cost of production. Such
a situation may not be fully unrealistic, considering for instance some new evidence in
support of the so-called "Porter hypothesis" [see Ambec and Lanoie (2008) for a recent
assessment of this much-debated view].7
This yields another proposition.
Proposition 4: Suppose the output market widens. Polluting ﬁrms will specialize by
procuring more AGS and doing less abatement themselves if outside AGS are increasingly
eﬀective and not purely end-of-pipe ( ,   0) and if in-house abatement conveys
a large opportunity cost ( +  ·   0).
Intuitively, the AGS market should also expand, inducing less in-house abatement and
more AGS outsourcing, following more stringent environmental regulation. Assume that
 +·  0 and  =0(meaning the abatement supplier’s technology is end-of-pipe,
which implies that  =0 ). The immediate (and commonly accepted) eﬀect of a higher




= − [(( +  · ) − ( +  · ))( ·  + )]  0 .( 2 1 )






= − [(−( +  · )+( +  · ))( ·  + )]  0 (22)
7The Porter hypothesis says that certain actions commanded by stricter environmental regulation can
improve both environmental performance and market competitiveness. To be fair, we must say that this
situation was a priori excluded in Stigler (1951)’s argument.




= − [( + )2].( 2 3 )
In-house abatement thus tends to increase, but the sign of 
 is actually uncertain since
 =  · 0 and   0.I f  is large enough (compared to the outsourced tech-
nology’s eﬀectiveness ), demand for external AGS is inelastic and the abater can then
exert signiﬁcant market power; in this case it may actually turn out, not unreasonably,
that 
  0 so polluting ﬁrms will do less AGS outsourcing. Our last proposition now
follows:
Proposition 5: Consider an increase in the emission tax. Then (supposing +· 
0 and  =  =0 ) in-house abatement always increases, but purchases of AGS may go
down if the abater can thereby exert large market power.
This proposition means that environmental policy may not only aﬀect the structure of the
eco-industry [David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2005)] but also the organization of polluting
ﬁrms [a possibility initially explored in Sinclair-Desgagné (1994)]. This and the above
have policy implications which will now be discussed.
4. Policy implications
From a public policy standpoint, the results derived in the previous section have the
following ramiﬁcations.
First, our model embeds two distinct instruments of environmental regulation:t h e
emission tax , of course, which level can be set by a regulator who maximizes some
form of social welfare, and the quality of external abatement  that the regulator may
want to set at some level (particularly when, by comparison, the emission tax involves
17high administrative or political costs). Each instrument entails speciﬁc compliance costs
through its own inﬂuence on the provision of AGS. In the previous section, a higher
emission tax induced higher abatement costs (since   0); subsection 3.2, on the other
hand, showed that outsourced AGS are cheaper when they are more eﬀective (for   0).
As we noticed early on, a positive emission tax  is necessary to generate some control
of polluting emissions in the ﬁrst place. Our ﬁndings suggest, however, that compliance
with environmental policy might be aided by also promoting the delivery of better AGS.
Secondly, the eco-industry is increasingly becoming - not necessarily for environmental
reasons, one has to admit - an explicit target for industrial policy [see Ernst and Young
(2006), Kojima (2008), People’s Daily Online (2006), and US Department of Commerce
(2001) for perspectives from Europe, Japan, China and the United States respectively].
The present analysis may shed light on the relative merits of two alternative instruments
to foster environmental innovation. On the one hand, the quality standard  might
correspond to the amount of resources (i.e. government subsidies) devoted to product-
i n n o v a t i o ni no r d e rt ob r i n gt ot h em a r k e tm o r ee ﬀective AGS; on the other hand, the
parameter ’s level may be proportional to the amount of resources directed at process-
innovation, which aims to reduce the cost of producing AGS. Since 
 and 
 are both
positive, raising either  or  will enhance the eco-industry’s market.9
For the eco-industry to expand and prosper with minimal public help, however, one
must again look at the value of outsourced AGS versus in-house abatement. As we just
9As shown in David and Sinclair-Desgagné (2009), moreover, combining the emission tax  with
appropriate subsidies to the eco-industry might also yield a ﬁrst-best allocation of resources.
18saw in the preceding section, a larger eco-industry does not fall automatically from more
stringent environmental regulation. Other factors play a role as well, such as the oppor-
tunity cost of in-house abatement and whether the AGS supplier holds signiﬁcant market
power. Interestingly, the size of the output market can also matter: as Proposition 4
shows, when the abater oﬀers “cleaner production” technologies (which seek to directly
modify the production process, as opposed to end-of-pipe approaches), both the down-
stream market and that for AGS tend to grow or shrink together. This suggests that,
when downstream output goes down (because the economy experiences a downturn, say),
government support should aim for the cleaner-production segment of the eco-industry.
5. Concluding remarks
This paper oﬀers a ﬁrst attempt at explaining the widespread and growing practice of
AGS outsourcing. Beyond the necessary environmental policies (an emission tax, in this
case), access to cheaper and better abatement technology, and more pressure on polluters
to focus on core business activities, lead polluting ﬁrms to rely further on a specialized
eco-industry for the needed means of emission control. The expansion of the output
market was also seen to make polluters procure more AGS and do less emission control
by themselves [as originally predicted by Stigler (1951) and Adam Smith], provided such
AGS are not end-of-pipe (a qualiﬁcation of the Smith-Stigler’s theorem which is speciﬁct o
the environmental goods and services sector), the opportunity cost of in-house abatement
is large and the AGS supplier’s market power (which is largely determined by the choice
of environmental regulation) is limited.
19The current model, however, did not allow to investigate one last important rationale
for AGS outsourcing, which is the opportunity for polluters to thereby share the risk of
noncompliance and legal liability. Stylized facts about the eco-industry seem to go here
against transaction costs economics [as exposed, for instance, in Lafontaine and Slade
(2007), Klein (2005), Whinston (2003), and Williamson (1975, 1985)]: while complying
with environmental regulations often involves speciﬁc investments, intricate know-how
and unforeseeable contingent actions, the current trend is clearly not towards the inter-
nalization of AGS by polluting ﬁrms. The property rights approach [Hart (1995)], on the
other hand, seems particularly relevant. Take, for instance, the following statement from
Blocki (2002):
Outsourcing can make the contractor a full ﬁnancial partner with contrac-
tual responsibilities for compliance, including reimbursement of any ﬁnes and
penalties for non-compliance. (...) Although the contractor cannot be held
responsible for any criminal liability that arises, this joint "ownership" can
provide maximum beneﬁts to the environment.
This amounts to saying that AGS outsourcing enables a polluting ﬁrm to make the abate-
ment supplier a residual claimant in matters of environmental compliance. In agreement
with the theory, "(...) the interests and motivations of the contractor can thereby be
closely aligned." [Blocki (2002)]
This research could be extended in a number of ways. For instance, one should allow
a monopolistic abatement supplier to set nonlinear prices and a regulator to use non-
linear taxes. Other typical issues of outsourcing, such as negotiation and renegotiation
between parties, asymmetric information and moral hazard should be considered. Since
this paper carried out what is mainly a positive analysis of the eco-industry, predictions
20should be tested empirically, and further normative considerations, such as the optimal
environmental and/or industrial policies dealing with an expanding eco-industry, should
be searched for. One should also examine a framework in which there is imperfect com-
petition between polluters and/or between AGS suppliers; in this context, the respective
incentives and bargaining power of polluting and abating ﬁrms would enter the analysis of
a polluter’s make-or-buy decision. Considering an oligopolistic eco-industry could ﬁnally
highlight some key issues on the organization of environmental R&D, such as the degree of
cooperation to allow between pollution abaters; as Poyago-Theotoky (2007) pointed out,
this extension may not constitute a straightforward application of the actual R&D liter-
ature, since taking environmental externalities into account brings in additional market
failures.
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     The following table summarizes our mathematical assumptions and results. 
  The eﬀect of 

 = −[ · 2]  0 ii { =   0 and 2  0}

 = − [−(( +  · ) − ( +  · ))]  0
ii {   0   0  =   0}   0,a n d +  ·   0

 = − [−(( +  · ) − ( +  · ))]  0
ii {   0   0  =   0}   0 and  +  ·   0
 The eﬀect of 

 = − [( ·  + )2]  0
ii [{ =  =0     0  =  ·  ·  and 2  0}

 = − [−( ·  + )(( +  · ) − ( +  · ))]  0
ii {   0  =  =0     0  =  ·  · }   0 and  +  ·   0

 = − [−( ·  + )(( +  · ) − ( +  · ))]  0
ii {   0  =  =0     0  =  ·  · }   0 and  +  ·   0
 The  eﬀect of 





  0  =0    0





 =0   =  ·  ·  =0  and  +  ·   0

 = − [(( +  · )( ·  + ) − ( + ))]  0
 {  0  =0    0  =  · 0   0and   0}  ≈ 0The eﬀec t of 

 =  [( +  · )( ·  + )]  0
 {  0  =  ·  · 0}  =0and  =  ·  ·  =0

 = − [( +  · )( ·  + )]  0
 {  0  =  ·  · 0}  =0   =  ·  ·  =0  and  +  ·   0

 = − [( +  · )( ·  + )]  0
if {  0  =  ·  · 0}  =0   =  ·  ·  =0    0 and   0

 = − [( +  · )( + )]  0 if {  0  =  ·  · 0}
 =0  and  =  ·  ·  =0 .

 =0 if  =0   =  ·  ·  =0 ,a n d =0( =  ·  ·  =0 )
The eﬀec t of 

 = − [(( +  · ) − ( +  · ))( ·  + )]  0 if  =  =0 
 =  ·  ·  =0   +  ·   0,  =0( =  ·  ·  =0 ) ,a n d =   0

 = − [(−( +  · )+( +  · ))( ·  + )]  0 if  =  =0 
 =  ·  ·  =0   +  ·   0  =0( =  ·  ·  =0 )  and  =   0

 = − [( + )2]  0
if  =0   =  ·  ·  =0   =0( =  ·  ·  =0 ),  
||
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